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ABSTRACT ■ This article compares the process and outcomes of collective
negotiations over the outsourcing of call centre jobs in US and German
telecommunications firms. In the USA, the Communication Workers of
America relied on coalitions with politicians and other organizations to lead
successful public campaigns; while in Germany, ver.di used coordinated 
bargaining with works councils to leverage their strong codetermination
rights. Variation in access to resources between countries helps explain 
differences in the unions’ ability to negotiate strong collective agreements on
outsourcing and to influence restructuring decisions.
KEYWORDS: call centres ■ Germany ■ outsourcing ■ telecommunications 
■ trade unions ■ USA ■ works councils
Introduction: National Institutions and 
Local Bargaining Power
The growing popularity of outsourcing is of particular concern to trade
unions, which often lose members and influence as firms move jobs out
of core workplaces. However, few studies have examined the causes of
unions’ varying success in engaging with management over outsourcing
decisions (for exceptions, see Hayakawa and Simard, 2001; Pulignano,
2005). Worker representatives typically lack clear bargaining rights over
restructuring measures such as outsourcing (Doellgast and Greer, 2007).
Union members also often have ambiguous views towards outsourcing,
as it may be part of a ‘core-periphery’ strategy that preserves the high pay
and privileges of the in-house workforce. Thus negotiations require con-
siderable communication between the local and national union or between
works councils and unions to build alternative forms of bargaining
power and support for a set of shared goals.
This study compares union influence on the outsourcing of call
centre work, using matched pair case studies of six US and German
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telecommunications firms. It has two goals: to examine the dynamics of
collective negotiations over outsourcing in different national settings; and
to analyse the factors that explain company-level variation in the out-
comes of those negotiations. Industrial relations scholars have debated
whether the institutions that influence bargaining outcomes are primarily
national or increasingly heterogeneous at the regional or firm level (e.g.
Locke, 1992). Today it is widely recognized that unions in both liberal and
social market countries rely on a variety of resources to build bargaining
power at a time of declining union density and influence (Frege and Kelly,
2003). The notion of a coherent national industrial relations system has
been undermined by the growing prevalence of company-level bargaining
and flight of employers from peak-level associations (Katz and
Darbishire, 2000; Marginson et al., 2003), which has been particularly
severe in Germany (Hassel, 1999). Under these conditions, do national
institutions still matter for the kinds of tactics and resources unions use to
influence local bargaining outcomes?
I argue here that the resources at the sub-national level that are critical 
for building bargaining power in negotiations over restructuring vary
between countries, reflecting differences in bargaining structures and bar-
gaining rights. In Germany, internal coordination between different worker
representatives through coordinated bargaining between unions and works
councils has long been viewed as the key to union strength (Thelen, 1991).
Today, unions’ ability to maintain or build these relationships with works
councils and the workforce is diminishing, but remains crucial for extending
their influence to new sectors and groups of workers across supply chains.
Local unions in the USA also benefit from information-sharing and strategy
development with the national union (Frost, 2000), but have fewer options
to institutionalize these relationships and leverage them in negotiations. This
lack of strong institutional supports means that external coalitions and mem-
ber mobilization are more important for building countervailing power.
In the following sections, I describe the cases and outcome variables;
discuss recent changes in markets and industrial relations institutions that
have encouraged firms to outsource call centre work; and then analyse
variation in union influence over outsourcing. Findings are based on over
200 interviews conducted between 2003 and 2005 with corporate and
local managers, works councillors and union representatives, as well as
on collective agreements and archival materials.
Case Studies
The US cases – Verizon Communications East (formerly NYNEX and
Bell Atlantic), BellSouth, and AT&T – are three of the largest competitors
in the landline segment of the industry, providing local, long-distance and
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broadband services. All grew out of the former monopoly known as the
‘Bell System’. NYNEX, Bell Atlantic, and BellSouth were Regional Bell
Operating Companies (RBOCs), or ‘Baby Bells’, that were divested from
AT&T, or ‘Ma Bell’, following a court order in 1984. All companies have
a long tradition of collective bargaining with the Communication
Workers of America (CWA), which since divestiture has remained the
dominant union in the industry.
The German cases – T-Com, T-Mobile, and T-Online – were three
separate business units of Deutsche Telekom (DT), the former
German monopoly provider, at the time of this study. In 2005, T-Online
was brought back into the parent company to take advantage of grow-
ing synergies between Internet and voice services. However, in 2003 each
still serviced different market segments and owned separate networks
of call centres. T-Com was the core business unit focusing on local landline
and long distance, T-Mobile was responsible for the company’s wireless
network and services, and T-Online focused on Internet services. All three
had strong works councils that negotiated collective agreements and elect-
ed representatives to DT’s group works council. T-Com and T-Mobile also
negotiated company agreements with the service union ver.di, while 
T-Online never concluded an agreement with ver.di.
In order to analyse variation in negotiations over outsourcing between
incumbent firms, it was necessary to accommodate the different structure
and history of the incumbent firms in each country. I use two measures
of union ‘success’ to compare outcomes across cases. First, agreements
that either bring union-represented jobs in-house or restrict the out-
sourcing of these jobs are typically advantageous from the union’s per-
spective, as they can increase both the pool of potential union members
and workers’ job security while limiting management’s ability to use the
threat of outsourcing to gain concessions. The extent to which unions
make concessions on pay and working conditions in exchange for these
agreements indicates whether limits on outsourcing are secured using
bargaining power or simply traded for job security. Second, the number
and kinds of jobs outsourced provides a measure of the impact of these
agreements on outsourcing strategies.
Changing Markets and Industrial Relations in
Telecommunications
Until the late 1990s, DT retained its monopoly in fixed line services, but
competitive conditions have since become increasingly similar in the two
countries. In the USA, the 1996 Telecommunications Act opened up com-
petition in the local telephone market while 1998 legislation in Germany
ended DT’s monopolies for network infrastructure and fixed-line voice
European Journal of Industrial Relations 14(3)
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telephony. At the same time, firms in new, less regulated segments such as
mobile phones and cable began competing for market share in Internet
services and local and long-distance calls.
These changes in markets have contributed to the growing fragmentation
of collective bargaining in both countries. In the USA, the CWA and
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) continued to rep-
resent workers at the regional Bells and AT&T following divestiture in
1984. However, national bargaining was soon eliminated, and today bar-
gaining occurs at company, business unit or regional level, depending on the
topic and the geographical scope of the company (Keefe and Batt, 1997). In
Germany, the Deutche Postgewerkschaft (DPG) negotiated a series of com-
pany agreements with DT and its subsidiaries, but no employers’ associa-
tion has been established to negotiate sectorally (Sako and Jackson, 2006).
In 2001, the DPG merged with four other service unions to form ver.di,
which currently has formal responsibility for representing workers in the
industry. However, new competitor firms have either negotiated company
agreements with other unions such as IG Metall or remained non-union.
As price competition grew and the non-union sector expanded in both
countries, incumbent firms began looking for ways to cut labour costs
and improve flexibility, with service and sales jobs a central focus.
Reduced long-distance costs and new call distribution technologies made
it easier to shift jobs to remote call centres or outsource work to third
party vendors – most of which had no or weak collective bargaining
institutions. The major telecommunications unions in both countries
sought to influence these decisions, but with variable success.
United States: Regional Bells and AT&T
The CWA has consistently opposed outsourcing, viewing it as a threat to
members’ jobs and its own bargaining power. However, the union
enjoyed strong leverage over outsourcing at Verizon, moderate success at
BellSouth, and failed in negotiations with AT&T. In all firms, the union
encountered different challenges for three areas of call centre work: trad-
itional customer service and sales work, operator services and directory
enquiries, and new work, such as outbound sales and technical support.
Verizon East
Traditional customer service and sales jobs are often difficult to out-
source because of their complexity and strategic importance for winning
and retaining customers. However, telecommunications firms have
attempted to outsource peaks in call volume or ‘hive off’ lower-skilled
tasks to send to third party firms. The CWA has negotiated the strongest
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contractual limits to moving these jobs at Verizon East, prohibiting out-
sourcing that would involve layoffs or part-time work and the permanent
transfer of more than 0.7 percent of CWA-represented jobs from the
county or state where it is currently performed. In addition, the union
negotiated rules in New York and New England that prevented consolida-
tion of call centres across ‘Interdepartment Transfer Areas’. In New York,
the company could not close down locations if employees would have to
commute more than 35 miles from their original work location. The CWA
won an arbitration case prior to 2003 bargaining, forcing Verizon to rein-
state over 2000 employees whose jobs had been cut.
Local contracts in the former NYNEX and Bell Atlantic regions also
prohibited the subcontracting of certain jobs, like telemarketing or
inbound calls. In the mid-1990s, Bell Atlantic formed a non-union sub-
sidiary called Bell Atlantic Plus and began moving some of its core cus-
tomer service and sales work to the new company at lower pay. In 1998
bargaining, the CWA made this a key issue, and during the ensuing strike
the union used a public campaign that highlighted poor customer service
at the new subsidiary. Bell Atlantic eventually agreed to bring all of the
work in-house and to limit future subcontracting (Katz et al., 2003).
US telecommunications companies downsized operator services in the
1990s and established separate directory enquiries centres, which man-
agers often argued were ‘new work’ and thus not covered by the contract.
Verizon East was the only company where the CWA has succeeded in
both keeping this work in-house and avoiding steep pay concessions.
Operators were moved into directory enquiries jobs, and pay remained
at between $10 and $20 an hour.
Other new categories of work, including service and sales for new prod-
ucts, technical support and telemarketing, were not covered by contracts at
any of the companies, and thus have been most vulnerable to outsourcing.
The CWA was successful in in-sourcing a number of these jobs at Verizon.
When Verizon East first started selling DSL high speed Internet services, it
outsourced inbound sales. The CWA led a successful campaign to bring
this work back in-house, arguing that because it was bundled with tradi-
tional phone services it fell under ‘protected’ work in their contract. In
New England, the CWA set up a formal partnership with Verizon man-
agement in 2003 to reduce absenteeism and improve productivity in the
call centres. Committees of local managers and stewards were established,
and federal mediators began facilitating regular meetings. After the part-
nership proved successful in reducing costs, managers agreed to in-source
DSL campaign and billing work. As a result, the company’s New England
customer service and sales centres hired over 200 new representatives
between 2004 and 2005, despite losing customers in the region.
Strong agreements limiting outsourcing also gave Verizon incentives to
find creative ways of using its higher-cost, difficult-to-downsize eastern
European Journal of Industrial Relations 14(3)
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workforce. For example, as call volumes dropped across New York, local
call centres had a surplus of employees, and local managers succeeded in
getting some inbound campaign work brought in-house. The union has
not been able to halt outsourcing entirely: for example, it was not able to
secure an agreement to in-source some 5000 technical support jobs for
DSL Internet services, which Verizon continues to outsource to US
and offshore locations. However, union representatives were optimistic
that they would be able to negotiate an agreement to bring these jobs in-
house.
BellSouth
The CWA had more limited success at BellSouth, and was forced to make
more substantial concessions to keep work in-house. As at Verizon, the
contracts prohibited outsourcing if it would involve layoffs or part-
time work. However, they did not restrict moving work between loca-
tions, which allowed management to consolidate call centres. A small
number of jobs that were viewed as less desirable, such as final collec-
tions, were outsourced with little resistance from the CWA.
The CWA made more substantial concessions to keep directory
enquiries in-house. BellSouth management informed the union in 1997
that it was planning to outsource this work, in anticipation of intensified
competition in local services. The CWA agreed to an alternative plan: the
company created a new subsidiary to serve BellSouth and other clients,
and negotiated a new contract with fewer benefits and pay at roughly half
the in-house rate. At the same time, it was also the only contract with
BellSouth that prohibited contracting out of work, and the CWA
obtained an agreement that BellSouth would not transfer any operator
work that had been performed in-house to the new company. According
to one CWA representative, the union was faced with ‘lose it all or try to
build a new bargaining unit’.
The CWA has had similarly mixed results with the outsourcing of ‘new
work’. In the early 2000s, the company started to outsource its online cus-
tomer support, but the union was able to use political pressure to convince
management to perform the work in-house. Now 125 ‘web reps’ handle
these jobs in a separate call centre, under the traditional customer serv-
ice contract. In 2004 bargaining, the company signed a letter of agreement
with the CWA to work together to move other ‘jobs of the future’ – such
as Voiceover Internet Protocol, wireless Internet, and video sales and
support – into the bargaining unit. However, union representatives
remained sceptical whether management would follow through on this
pledge, and had not yet begun negotiations on pay or working conditions for
the new jobs. BellSouth also outsourced all telemarketing work in 1998 and
some outbound collections work in 2000.
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AT&T
The CWA has had the least success at AT&T. Managers circumvented
contract provisions prohibiting outsourcing by moving core customer
service and sales work outside the ‘Geographic Service Area’ of 35 miles.
Before 1997, AT&T routed ‘low value’ customers, with bills of under $50
a month, to a vendor, while the higher-value customers were still serviced
by the in-house workforce. Then in the late 1990s, AT&T began to out-
source and offshore most remaining long-distance work, keeping several
domestic call centres open as benchmarks for vendor performance. By
2004, AT&T was outsourcing 45 percent of its calls, including two-thirds
of its long-distance calls. Between January 1999 and December 2003, the
number of in-house customer service employees dropped from 7500 to
3300, while the number at subcontractors employed on AT&T’s accounts
grew from 830 to around 3500.
In 2001, the CWA initiated a partnership with AT&T to develop a joint
plan to in-source this work, using leverage over the regulatory approval
that the company needed to divest its wireless, broadband and manufac-
turing equipment. AT&T provided detailed information on its outsourc-
ing activities and data on the cost difference between the in-house and
outsourced workforce, which it estimated at around 40 percent. After
recalculating to reflect higher quality, productivity and sales at union cen-
tres, the CWA narrowed the cost difference to 15 percent for domestic
outsourcing and 30 percent for outsourcing to India. The CWA and
AT&T also formed a joint committee to address absenteeism at in-house
call centres, which resulted in a pilot project to introduce job rotation and
flexible scheduling. The union demonstrated positive effects on morale,
and management agreed to extend the pilot.
These various initiatives were cut short in 2004 when AT&T decided to
pull out of the residential long distance market following a regulatory
change. AT&T subsequently closed several of its own domestic call cen-
tres, leading to a loss of around 550 union jobs, and cut a thousand vendor
jobs. AT&T also unilaterally outsourced directory enquiries work, moving
all new calls to several vendors in the early 1990s. In 1997, managers
approached the CWA to discuss bringing some of this work in-house, and
eventually created a separate group of operators at a lower pay scale, start-
ing at $6.30 an hour at a time when other operators in the company were
making over $20 an hour. However, AT&T was unable to create sustained
demand for the new service, and in 2004 it closed the centres and laid off
the last of their dwindling workforce. AT&T was also the first of CWA’s
employers to outsource outbound telemarketing work on a large scale.
Following divestiture, AT&T moved all telemarketing calls to its non-
union subsidiary Transtech, with hourly wages at roughly half the equiva-
lent pay for union members. The CWA attempted to organize Transtech in
the early to mid-1990s, but was unsuccessful.
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272
Comparison
Table 2 compares contractual protections against outsourcing work and
outsourcing strategies. Verizon East had the strongest agreements and
least extensive outsourcing, AT&T had the weakest agreements and most
extensive outsourcing, while BellSouth had mixed outcomes.
What explains the differences between these three cases? Competitive
pressures varied: AT&T came under earlier pressure to cut costs when
the long-distance market was liberalized in the late 1980s. However,
Verizon East and BellSouth also faced growing price competition from
the late 1990s, and still kept more core customer service and sales work
in-house than AT&T. In addition, the CWA was able to prevent direc-
tory enquiries and ‘new work’ from being outsourced under strong
agreements at Verizon but had more mixed outcomes at BellSouth,
although both companies enjoyed stable regional monopolies.
A second difference may be in employer strategies. AT&T adopted a
cost-cutting strategy earlier than the two ‘baby Bells’, in response to intense
price competition in the long-distance segment. This encouraged manage-
ment to outsource aggressively while Verizon and BellSouth continued to
view their in-house call centre workforce as a key asset for building sales in
new segments. However, two pieces of evidence suggest that outcomes are
not solely or primarily driven by these differing strategies. First, interviews
with managers at both Verizon and BellSouth made it clear that they would
prefer to increase their use of outsourcing or offshoring to cut costs, but
were explicitly limited from doing so by their union contracts and the threat
of negative publicity from union-led campaigns. Second, at all three firms,
management had adopted similar outsourcing strategies, such as setting up
non-union subsidiaries or subcontracting lower-skilled jobs; but only
reversed these strategies following union pressure at Verizon (and to a lesser
extent at BellSouth).
The case studies suggest that variation in agreements on outsourcing and
actual company practices were strongly influenced by the CWA’s success
in building bargaining power at company level, using the resources of
external coalitions and member mobilization. Before divestiture, the CWA
played an important role in lobbying state Public Service Commissions
(PSCs) on behalf of employer applications for rate increases. The union
learned to leverage this support, together with joint campaigns with other
unions, community groups, and local politicians, in exchange for
favourable agreements with the regional Bells. These coalition strategies in
turn relied on the union’s ability to show strong internal solidarity through
strikes and other forms of direct action.
The CWA could best combine these resources at Verizon East because
of strong membership density, location in states with strong labour laws,
a tradition of local militancy and a legacy of strong collective agreements
secured through several successful campaigns in the 1980s and 1990s.
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During a 17-week strike in 1989 against reductions in health care provi-
sion the union also adopted a new set of strategies that combined political
lobbying and coalitions with community groups to bolster its position at
the bargaining table, working with the IBEW for the first time to coord-
inate a campaign of public petitions, rallies and pickets. For the first time
it opposed a rate increase that NYNEX had requested from the PSC; and
CWA representatives used their personal connections with New York’s
democratic Governor, Mario Cuomo, to build additional pressure. This
resulted in a largely successful settlement, when broader concessions were
made in other former Bell companies.
The CWA later used a similar approach when it publicly supported the
merger between NYNEX and Bell Atlantic in 1998 in exchange for a
series of agreements that would become important for preventing or
reversing outsourcing. In addition, the union coordinated a campaign in
1998 that embarrassed Bell Atlantic into bringing core work from its
non-union call centre subsidiary back in-house. This relied on strikes
and public advertisements highlighting poor customer service, both of
which were supported by a well-organized membership base.
At BellSouth and AT&T, the CWA sought to use similar tactics, but
was less successful. BellSouth was based in ‘right-to-work’ states where
the CWA could not apply a closed shop, which made it more difficult to
organize members and to mount prolonged strikes. The union also
enjoyed less political support in these regions. In contrast to the Bells,
AT&T was a national company, and so had broader scope for
moving work to regions with cheaper labour costs and looser regulations.
AT&T was also regulated by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) rather than state PSCs, which made it more difficult to use 
state-level lobbying (Batt and Darbishire, 1997). To compensate for this
weaker position, the CWA relied more heavily on partnership agreements
at the two companies, without the kind of backing from a militant mem-
bership and external coalitions enjoyed at Verizon East. However, these
were discontinued following unpopular restructuring measures in the late
1990s and early 2000s (including outsourcing) that were imposed unilat-
erally by management.
Germany: Deutsche Telekom
At DT’s three core business units – T-Com, T-Mobile, and T-Online – the
DPG (later ver.di) and the works councils initially viewed outsourcing as a
compromise that allowed management to cut costs while protecting mem-
bers’ working conditions. However, they began to oppose outsourcing as
market growth slowed, as benchmarking with subcontractors increased,
and as management began to push more aggressively for layoffs. As in the
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USA, the union’s success in negotiations over outsourcing varied across
firms, with strong agreements at T-Com, mixed outcomes at T-Mobile and
general failure at T-Online. Because there has been less segmentation of call
centre work in Germany compared to the USA, I focus here on strategies
toward core customer service and sales work and lower-skilled jobs such
as directory enquiries and telemarketing.
T-Com
DT’s landline division, T-Com, faced growing price competition and a declin-
ing customer base in the late 1990s, as in AT&T and the regional Bells.
However, management did not outsource its core customer service and sales
jobs. This was due in part to the complexity and strategic importance attached
to this work (Matuschek et al., 2007), but was also influenced by strong col-
lectively negotiated constraints, including Standortsicherungsverträge (loca-
tion security agreements) and job security protections. As a former public
company, T-Com retained a number of Beamten (civil servants) who enjoy
lifetime job security. The DPG also succeeded in maintaining and extending
job security agreements that prevented involuntary layoffs.
The difficulties this posed for reducing employment shaped subse-
quent organizational strategies. Between 1995 and 2004, DT cut 110,000
positions in its core operations, largely through early retirement, volun-
tary redundancy and natural turnover. Redundant employees who did
not accept these options were moved into a ‘temporary employment and
qualification company’, or Beschäftigungsgesellschaft, set up in 2002,
which placed employees on short-term assignments both within and out-
side the company. These arrangements were expensive, and management
began to put pressure on union and works council representatives to
cooperate with cost-cutting measures (Holtgrewe, 2006). In 1998, the
DPG agreed to allow management to shift directory enquiries jobs to a
vendor in exchange for pay increases for the in-house workforce. T-Com
outsourced 2800 of its 3500 directory enquiries jobs, and surplus
employees were moved to new jobs in T-Com or in DT’s other sub-
sidiaries. The company also reorganized special campaign work, remain-
ing directory enquiries work and late night work into a subsidiary and
outsourced some outbound telemarketing work to third-party vendors.
By 2003, DT’s internal temporary placement agency had close to
20,000 employees, entitled to their former rates of pay even if managers
were unable to find work for them. In January 2004, DT set up a new call
centre subsidiary to provide employment for these workers called
Vivento Customer Services (VCS), to handle the corporate group’s
lower-skilled service and sales work, allow the company to in-source
directory enquiries jobs, and eventually compete in the call centre vendor
market.
European Journal of Industrial Relations 14(3)
276
In 2003, DT announced future cuts of up to 40,000 jobs and made it
clear that without concessions, management would not extend job secur-
ity agreements. In March 2004, ver.di concluded an employment pact
with the company that reduced working time from 38 to 34 hours with
only partial wage compensation. In return, job security protections were
extended until the end of 2008. Ver.di was also able to keep VCS under
the DT collective agreement with guaranteed job security but with a 8.75
percent reduction in pay.
Ver.di saw the creation of VCS as a positive development that would
allow the company to take back thousands of jobs that had been out-
sourced to vendors under a strong collective agreement. With a planned
expansion to over 5000 employees, it would be the largest call centre ven-
dor in Germany. This represented a shift in ver.di’s position, since union
officials came to view outsourcing as a threat to their members and their
organization as managers started benchmarking costs against vendors.
Works councils were more divided, as they feared that more work would
be moved from T-Com’s call centres to VCS. Ver.di and the T-Com works
councils were thus cautiously cooperating with the new VCS plan, help-
ing DT to find new markets for the workforce while keeping the pressure
on management to keep ‘core’ work in the company’s sales and service
centres.
T-Mobile
In contrast to T-Com, T-Mobile enjoyed stable growth in call volume
and employment throughout the 1990s as the wireless market expanded.
This allowed the company to increase its use of subcontractors for core
service and sales calls without threatening the jobs of its in-house work-
force. T-Mobile built up its call centres and brought in surplus employ-
ees from T-Com, while simultaneously outsourcing peaks in call volume,
vacations, night shifts, and outbound campaigns to provide additional
flexibility and benchmark agent performance.
Works councils at T-Mobile originally saw outsourcing as a comple-
mentary strategy to improving job security and avoiding unsocial work-
ing times. By the late 1990s, however, growth in the market had slowed
and several alternative network providers had expanded their market
share. In early 2000, T-Mobile closed one of its call centres and began
subcontracting a larger proportion of its core work. As a result, job
security and outsourcing became central issues in the 2002–03 bargaining
round. Management wanted to outsource more work while the union
and works councils were strongly opposed. After difficult negotiations,
T-Mobile agreed that no locations would be closed until 2008 but that
additional call volume could be subcontracted out as long as no jobs were
lost. In return, the works councils approved a more flexible working time
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model that they had previously opposed and ver.di agreed to a 1 percent
pay rise instead of the 2.1 percent it had demanded. They also agreed that
calls during ‘unsocial’ hours – when employees had been entitled to over-
time pay – could be outsourced to cheaper providers.
T-Online
T-Online was the only subsidiary without a union-negotiated collective
agreement, although it did have works agreements negotiated by the
company’s strong works councils. T-Online took over call centre loca-
tions from T-Com as the online business expanded, allowing some con-
tinuity in works council leadership. In the late 1990s, the company first
began focusing on customer service in response to rising call volume and
complaints, and in a few years grew to five locations with between 300 to
350 employees in each.
Then in 2002, T-Online sold three of these locations to different call
centre vendors. The company retained two locations in Kiel and
Oldenburg, which today handle mostly second-level technical support.
Managers kept around 10 percent of first-level technical support in-
house to benchmark vendor performance, but subcontracted out the
other 90 percent. Ver.di and the central works council went through four
rounds of negotiations, and eventually secured an agreement that pay and
working conditions would remain the same for 18 months after the new
companies took over, along with full job security and extension of previ-
ous agreements with the works councils. After this time, the new com-
panies were free to renegotiate their employment contracts or to move
the calls to their other locations.
The decision to outsource these jobs increased pressure on the in-house
workforce to agree to concessions, given the growing difference in pay and
working conditions between in-house and outsourced call centres. For
example, the T-Online works council negotiated strong agreements pro-
tecting its call centre employees from silent monitoring and individual
evaluation. However, some works councillors considered relaxing these
rules to improve their ‘competitiveness’, following a successful pilot at the
company’s vendors of a new monitoring programme that allowed supervi-
sors to collect and analyse detailed data on individual agent performance.
One works councillor described being verbally attacked by employees at
the annual meeting for not giving in to employer demands and thus threat-
ening their jobs.
A new round of negotiations with ver.di followed DT’s decision to
bring T-Online into the parent company in 2005. The original agreement
between T-Online and DT laying out the conditions of the merger
included a plan to outsource the Kiel and Oldenburg locations, but ver.di
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won an agreement to integrate all locations and employees into T-Com.
Managers also agreed to a 38 hour week across T-Online, and were not
able to lay off employees or close locations until a new collective agree-
ment was negotiated under T-Com. At the same time, most of the com-
pany’s online work would continue to be outsourced.
Comparison
Table 3 compares collective agreements on outsourcing and outsourcing
strategies in the German cases. T-Com had the most favourable outcomes,
T-Mobile traded limits against larger concessions on pay and working
conditions, while T-Online had no formal agreements and outsourced the
majority of call centre jobs.
What explains the variation across the three companies? Again, compet-
itive pressures differed. T-Mobile and T-Online expanded employment in
the 1990s in response to market growth, and thus works councillors were
more willing to accept some outsourcing of core work; while T-Com’s
works councillors opposed restructuring measures that could lead to job
cuts at a time when their company was downsizing. However, these dif-
ferences explain the strength of union resistance rather than differences
in external pressures on employers – if anything, T-Com had more of an
incentive to outsource work than the mobile and online subsidiaries, as it
faced the most intense price competition (like AT&T). In addition, cost
cutting pressures and worker attitudes towards outsourcing have become
more similar in the three firms as competition increased and market
growth slowed across the sectors.
Employer strategies may also help to explain variation in outcomes. 
T-Com management has more continuity from the old Bundespost
and still values close relationships with worker representatives. 
T-Online’s managers were more often recruited externally and developed
a reputation for independence from the parent company, which may
explain both their aggressive approach towards outsourcing and their
resistance to negotiating a collective agreement. However, as with the US
cases, managers at T-Com and T-Mobile made it clear in interviews and
through their actions that they did not feel free to pursue a unilateral
strategy of outsourcing, despite the attractiveness in terms of cost savings
and flexibility.
As in the USA, variation across the companies in the union’s bargain-
ing power provides an important explanation for these differences.
However, while the CWA relied on strong external coalitions, ver.di
depended on access to strong coordinated bargaining structures at com-
pany level, again supported by its ability to mobilize a well-organized
base of union members.
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After DT adopted a divisional structure in the late 1990s, T-Com was
the only major division that remained legally within the parent company.
This meant that there was continuity in employment and bargaining
structures from the old public monopoly. Membership density remained
close to 70 percent, and around 30 percent of employees were Beamten
with lifetime job security. When T-Mobile and T-Online were established
as separate subsidiaries, managers sought to recruit a younger, more flex-
ible workforce. Employees had the option to move from T-Com to the
subsidiaries, typically with higher pay, but were required to take tem-
porary leave from their Beamte status, which they would then lose after
five years if they did not transfer back. Younger employees were more
likely to take this option. Both these transferred employees and new
hires lacked the strong historical ties to the DPG found in T-Com, and
union density was lower, at around 15 percent at T-Mobile and 5 percent
at T-Online. While most works councillors at the three companies were
ver.di members, communication with their colleagues at other locations
or with the union remained strongest at T-Com, was being strengthened
at T-Mobile, but was still quite weak at T-Online.
This difference in the history and structure of bargaining influenced
the level of information exchange and coordinated strategy development
between worker representatives. At T-Com, considerable consultation
occurred at different levels. Union and works council members on the
supervisory board were informed about organizational restructuring
decisions well in advance, and in some cases, special committees provided
an additional forum for consultation over issues that unions and works
councils viewed as strategically important. For example, a joint
Innovation and Employment Advisory Committee (Innovations- und
Beschäftigungsbeirat) was established in the late 1990s. T-Com managers
felt that they could not implement major restructuring decisions with-
out consulting the union, and every month a permanent board of com-
pany representatives informed works council representatives about 
re-engineering plans. This bargaining power, combined with the strong
job security protections that were a legacy of the company’s public sec-
tor history, meant that ver.di was able to negotiate an agreement to 
in-source directory enquiries with only marginal pay concessions, while
extending job security protections.
At T-Mobile, works councillors felt that ver.di played an important
role in negotiating collective agreements and supporting the works coun-
cils, but noted that they were not in frequent contact with the union and
received more support from the central works council. Worker represen-
tatives at all three companies agreed that the union was considerably
weaker in the subsidiaries, which made it more difficult to convince
works councils to take a solidaristic position on outsourcing across loca-
tions. Several T-Mobile works councillors said that while they supported
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ver.di, they did not see it as their job to convince workers to become
members.
As at T-Com, T-Mobile union and works council representatives also
pointed to coordinated bargaining as the key to their success in getting a
collective agreement in 2003 that improved job security protections and
limited future outsourcing. At the same time, the works councils made
substantial concessions in working time flexibility and the union settled
on a small overall pay increase to secure this agreement.
At T-Online, this kind of coordinated campaign was not possible during
negotiations over the 2002 decision to outsource three call centres to third-
party vendors. Ver.di did not yet have a collective agreement with T-Online
and played only a marginal role in working with the works councils to
develop a coordinated strategy. This exacerbated the problem of competi-
tion across locations for jobs, which was manifest in the lack of solidarity
among T-Online’s works councils at the time of negotiations over out-
sourcing. Works councils at locations that remained in the company did
not oppose the decision, as they had secured job security agreements for
their own members.
Since the conclusion of my research, outsourcing has become an even
more contentious and public issue at DT. In 2006, it transferred five of
the 19 call centres in its Vivento CS subsidiary, with around 700 employ-
ees, to two subcontractors. Employees’ pay and working conditions were
secured until 2008, but after that time the new employers will presum-
ably renegotiate contracts at a lower level. In 2006, ver.di also agreed to
reduced starting pay for new hires in T-Mobile’s call centres. This fol-
lowed an emotional campaign in which management threatened to sell its
call centres to a vendor if its terms were not accepted.
Then in 2007 DT announced plans to shift 50,000 of its technical service,
technical infrastructure, and call centre jobs into three new subsidiaries,
and demanded the renegotiation of pay and working conditions in these
subsidiaries. Although ver.di led a six week strike with strong support from
its membership, both parties eventually agreed to reduce wage levels for
current employees by 6.5 percent over 42 months and increase working
time from 34 to 38 weeks without pay compensation. In addition, new
employees will earn 30 percent below the current level, the use of variable
pay will increase, and the regular working week in call centres will include
Saturdays. Management agreed to extend job security until 2012 and to not
sell the new service subsidiaries until 2010. An important factor in ver.di’s
decision to return to negotiations was management’s threat to transfer
employees to the new companies without a collective agreement. This will
have further negative implications for the coordination of bargaining with-
in DT, as works councils will be obliged to develop a new structure for
decision-making at each business unit and across the corporation.
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These recent developments suggest that the decentralization of collective
bargaining, growth of a non-union sector, and increased price competition
in the German telecommunications industry are further weakening ver.di’s
ability to rely on its traditional forms of bargaining power – even in the
company’s traditional ‘core’ business. The result will be growing conver-
gence in employment conditions and outsourcing strategies across DT’s
business units, as well as increased labour market segmentation across the
corporation and its subcontractors.
Discussion
Industrial relations scholars have long argued that national institutions
provide German unions with distinctive forms of bargaining leverage in
negotiations over restructuring decisions. The causal relationship
between national institutions and local bargaining outcomes is less trans-
parent today, as union density and bargaining coverage decline and as
employer strategies become increasingly varied at the firm- and estab-
lishment-level. One argument holds that strong representation rights and
encompassing bargaining structures in Germany continue to provide
workers with the tools to exercise some measure of industrial democracy
lacking in the USA (Croucher and Singe, 2002; Katz and Darbishire,
2000). Other scholars argue that unions’ bargaining power has been sub-
stantially weakened as decentralization allows firms an ‘exit’ from expen-
sive collective bargaining arrangements (Hassel, 1999; Menz, 2005). This
article has contributed to this debate by shifting the focus away from
macro-level trends in the scope and organization of bargaining, and
exploring how unions actually use different institutions to build bargain-
ing power and influence restructuring outcomes.
The case studies show that union success in engaging with management
over outsourcing decisions differed within rather than between the USA
and Germany. Unions in both countries had uneven access to three
resources identified in past studies of work restructuring: internal coord-
ination, external coalitions and member mobilization. However, the rela-
tive importance of these resources to unions’ success differed between the
countries. In the USA, the CWA relied on external coalitions backed up
by member mobilization to compensate for weaker bargaining rights and
more fragmented bargaining structures. Bargaining power was strongest
at Verizon East because of favourable labour laws, high union density, a
militant and well-organized membership base, relationships with local
politicians and other unions and lobbying influence at state regulatory
agencies. In Germany, ver.di relied on strong internal coordination, again
supported by a well-organized membership base. The union enjoyed the
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greatest influence over outsourcing decisions in T-Com, where it was able
to use its close relationships with works councils and its members to
negotiate strong collective agreements and encourage alternative invest-
ment strategies.
These findings suggest that the distinctive features of national industrial
relations institutions continue to play an important role in negotiations
over restructuring, but are becoming less useful as static variables that
explain company-level variation in restructuring outcomes. Worker rep-
resentatives remain embedded in their respective political and economic
environment and are still dependent on labour laws and bargaining
arrangements to gain advantage at the bargaining table. However, in both
the USA and Germany, decentralization has put unions under similar
pressure to innovate, using old resources in new ways. This is by no
means a new development – the meaning and use of industrial relations
institutions have varied more considerably over time than their formal
rules and structures. Jackson (2005), for example, has pointed out that
German codetermination has gone through considerable changes as actors
used relatively stable institutions in creative ways in response to new chal-
lenges. What does seem to be new is the extent of variation in the out-
comes of this process within social market countries like Germany, where
unions were traditionally able to extend bargaining gains across firms in
an industry. DT’s recent unilateral decision to move its call centre jobs to
a separate subsidiary suggests that even established sources of bargaining
leverage can be undermined by increasing cost-based pressures and shift-
ing organizational strategies.
The generalizability of these findings may be limited by several factors.
First, the telecommunications industry has a number of unique charac-
teristics. In both the USA and Germany, it was long organized as a
national monopoly that negotiated with one major union, and its market
position continues to be heavily dependent on national and regional reg-
ulation. The CWA’s bargaining power is strengthened by its ability to
leverage established relationships with regulatory agencies and polit-
icians. Meanwhile, ver.di’s bargaining position has been substantially
weakened by the rapid entry of non-union firms to the German telecom-
munications market and the lack of a sectoral agreement. A comparison
with negotiations over outsourcing in other industries, such as car man-
ufacturing, may reveal greater cross-national variation in outcomes. At
the same time, it is striking that such large differences can be observed
across the business units of DT, a single, large German employer, that are
comparable to those found between the separate companies of the former
Bell system in the USA.
By focusing on core employers, I have chosen cases where unions are
most likely to enjoy institutionalized channels of influence. German
unions may adopt similar strategies to US unions in new industries or
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firms, where they lack strong relationships with works councils or estab-
lished positions on supervisory boards. At the same time, several recent
studies have found that German unions have had broader difficulties
implementing new strategies that rely on coalition-building or external
forms of public pressure to organize new industries and groups of work-
ers (Aust and Holst, 2006; Baccaro et al., 2003). The lack of a tradition
of more confrontational strategies, which developed in the USA under
conditions of weak labour laws, may prove a greater obstacle to new org-
anizing efforts.
Unions’ influence over management practices and working conditions
increasingly depends on their ability to negotiate agreements that limit
outsourcing. The findings from this study demonstrate that unions in
both liberal and social market countries can gain an independent voice
in these restructuring decisions through using traditional forms of bar-
gaining power in innovative ways. However, they are unlikely to sustain
their access to increasingly scarce resources and to shape the future pro-
duction strategies of firms without considerable effort, creativity and
organized political action.
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